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(How) Is Aging a Health Policy Problem?
Joseph White, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
During the 1990s, the claim that an aging population constituted a
long-term "crisis" became a policy clich6. This assertion became
particularly popular among elite journalists and academics in the United
States. For example, Washington Post columnist David Broder wrote of "the
fiscal calamity that the retirement of the baby-boom generation poses for
the early years of the next century."1 Former Director of the Congressional
Budget Office (and current President of the Urban Institute) Robert
Reischauer referred to "the demographic tsunami of the baby boom's
retirement., 2 Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office and U.S. General
Accounting Office began issuing reports projecting the date of economic
doomsday caused by spiraling deficits that would be caused, in turn, by
burgeoning pension and health care costs.3 Because Medicare costs have
grown far more quickly than Social Security obligations-though the latter
will still remain larger than the former for many years-and because a
significant portion of Medicaid spending also covers the elderly, much of
this commentary has focused on health care costs in particular. Eminent
health economist Victor Fuchs wrote that health care costs for the elderly
"could plunge the nation into a severe economic and social crisis within
two decades., 4 Former Colorado Governor Richard D. Lamm wrote of "the
* Luxenberg Family Professor of Public Policy at Case Western Reserve University,
Cleveland, Ohio. An earlier version of this Article was written for an international health
policy conference that chose the challenge posed by aging as it theme. I therefore thank
the organizers of the Four Country Conference: Aging and Health Policy, held in
Gananoque, Ontario, Canada onJuly 12-14, 2001, especially the staff of the International
Affairs Directorate of Health Canada, for their encouragement.
1. David S. Broder, The Party's Over: By 2000, the GOP or the Democrats Could Fade in Favor
of a Third Party, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1999, at Cl.
2. Burt Solomon, OK, Now What?, 28 NAT'LJ. 2394, 2394 (1996).
3. JOSEPH WHrrE, FALSE ALARM 73-98 (2d ed. 2003).
4. Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care for the Elderly: How Much? Who Will Pay?, HEALTH AFF.,
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moral imperative of limiting elderly health entitlements," claiming that
program costs would otherwise impoverish the young.5
jeremiads about the challenges of aging in general, and of paying for
the health care costs of the elderly in particular, have been especially loud
in the United States, where they have dovetailed conveniently with an
underlying ideological campaign to cut government programs.6 However,
these demographic trends and budgetary pressures exist in all countries,
and so this concern is heard around the world. Indeed, it has become a
common theme in the international policy community.7 The World Bank,
for example, has promoted this view of imminent crisis through its study
Averting the Old Age Crisis and subsequent publications and conferences.8
These worries regarding cost and inequity are based on plausible
inferences. As people age, they tend to have higher medical expenses.
Thus, if a larger portion of the population consists of older people,, one
might expect higher medical spending. In turn, pressure for higher
spending poses issues of policy-how to pay, whether to pay-and ethics-
the moral basis for providing or withholding benefits.
Yet, I will argue that, as a matter of both policy and ethics,
policymakers and citizens need not worry about the implications of aging
for medical costs. Aging of the population has some effect on health costs,
but a much smaller effect than those factors that are both more susceptible
to manipulation and pose less difficult ethical dilemmas. The aging of the
population does pose economic and budgetary challenges, but the
contribution of health care costs to this equation is relatively minor; policy-
makers would do better to focus on other concerns such as pension
expenses and participation in the workforce. For these reasons; the health
care costs of an aging population do not justify changes in health policy
that would not otherwise be appropriate.
Nonetheless, aging poses a distinct health policy problem, which is
only beginning to receive attention: The challenge will be less how to
finance care than how to deliver it. The delivery challenge has two
dimensions-how the health care system is organized and whether the
Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 11, 11.
5. Richard D. Lamm, The Moral Imperative of Limiting Elderly Health Entitlements, in
POLICIES FOR AN AGING SOCIETY 199, 199 (Stuart H. Altman & David I. Shactman eds., 2002).
6. See generally WHITE, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., AGING IN OECD COUNTRIES (Soc.
Pol'y Stud. No. 20, 1996) [hereinafter AGING IN OECD COUNTRIES] ; Peter Hicks, The Impact
of Aging on Public Policy, OECD OBSERVOR, Dec.-Jan. 1996, at 19.
8. WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS (1994).
IV:I1 (2004)
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necessary workers or caregivers will be available.
This Article begins by putting in perspective the effect of aging on
health care spending. I compare aging to other factors and explain why
America's peculiar health care finance system exaggerates our perception
of the aging crisis. I challenge the notion that a growing population of the
"old old," i.e., individuals age eighty-five and over, will be so expensive as to
create severe ethical dilemmas. Next I look more closely at the distribution
of costs and benefits between the elderly and other citizens. Specifically, I
argue that increased longevity does not change the fairness of pay-as-you-
go social insurance. Higher costs will call for tradeoffs, but there are good
reasons to argue that health care for the elderly in particular should not be
reduced. Rather, policymakers would do better to use caution today in all
dimensions of budgetary policy to make choices easier in the future. They
should also take steps to increase workforce participation, especially
among the elderly.
Finally, I turn to what I see as the more significant effects of an aging
population-the effects on demand for services, and the almost inevitable
mismatch between the organization and supply of services on the one
hand and geriatric care needs on the other. In this regard, long term
care-which does not fit squarely into the categories of medical care, social
service, or income protection-is of particular interest.
This Article is based on a review of the situation in the nations of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) more
generally. A comparative perspective reveals that discussion outside the
United States is beginning to move beyond a simplistic focus on the "crisis"
of future health care costs associated with an aging society. It is time for
discussion within the United States to do the same.
I. PUTTING THE HEALTH CARE SPENDING EFFECT OF AGING IN PERSPECTIVE
A. Aging Compared to Other Factors
All other things being equal, an aging society should increase the
share of gross domestic product (GDP) that is dedicated to medical
services. The denominator reflects the number of workers, while the
numerator depends on demand for medical services. The aging problem,
as conventionally conceived, arises from the supposition that a larger share
of the population will retire each year. Hence, the elderly population will
rise more quickly than the supply of workers. As a result, if the population
that demands medical services grows more quickly than the working
population, spending on medical services can be expected to grow more
3
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quickly than national production.
Yet all other things are never equal, and health care costs as a share of
GDP depend on far more than demographic factors. Namely, health care
costs depend on the extent to which new services are made available to
citizens of all ages, on the extent to which those new services replace or
supplement previous methods of care, and above all, on the prices paid for
whichever services are provided. According to OECD statistics, the United
States has the second smallest proportion of the population over age sixty-
five among all rich democracies, yet by far the highest health care
spending as a percent of GDP.9 Why? As Gerard Anderson and colleagues
argue, "It's the Prices, Stupid!"'0 We simply pay much more per service.
In some analyses, such non-demographic factors overwhelm any effect
of population aging on spending. As Marmor and Oberlander have
summarized, "[F] rom 1960 to 1990 there was no correlation across OECD
nations between aging populations and growth in medical costs."" Using
different techniques, Gruber and Wise reported that, from 1980 to 1991,
there was a positive but not statistically significant relationship between the
elderly share of the population and national health spending. 2 That
relationship might imply, for example, that aging would cause health care
spending in average OECD nations to rise by about 0.9% of GDP between
1990 and 2025.'3 However, that is distinctly smaller than the estimated
9. Population 65 Years Old and Over - % of Total Population, Org. for Econ. Cooperation
& Dev., at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/29/1935784.xls (last visited Jan. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter Population 65 Years Old and Over]; Total Expenditure on Health - % GDP, Org. for
Econ. Cooperation & Dev., at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/17/1935602.xls (last
visited Jan. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Total Expenditures on Health]. In the year 2000, 12.3% of
Americans were 65 or over-tied with Australia and ahead of New Zealand at 11.7%.
Population 65 Years Old and Over, supra. The United States spent 13% of GDP on health care;
the nearest competitor was Switzerland at 10.7%. Total Expenditure on Health, supra.
10. Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from
Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2003, at 89, 90.
11. Theodore R. Marmor & Jon Oberlander, Rethinking Medicare Reform, HEALTH AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 52, 55.
12. Jonathon Gruber & David Wise, An International Perspective on Policies for an Aging
Society, in POLICIES FOR AN AGING SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 34, 57.
13. Gruber and Wise report a coefficient of 0.099, meaning that health spending as a
percent of GDP would rise by 0.099 points for each one point increase in the elderly share
of the total population. Gruber & Wise, supra note 12, at 55. The average percentage of
population age sixty-five in OECD nations is projected to rise from 12.2% in 1990 to 21% in
2025.JEAN-MARC BURNIAUX ET AL., COPING WITH AGEING: A DYNAMIC APPROACH TO QUANTIFY
THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS ON FUTURE LABOUR SUPPLY IN OECD COUNTRIEs
IV:I1 (2004)
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impact of other cost-increasing dynamics-which tend to be summarized as
"technological progress." A recent German study, for example, concluded
that, due to aging, contribution rates to the sickness funds in Germany
would have to rise from 13.6% of covered payroll to 16% by 2040. 4 "By
comparison," it added, "technological progress will more forcefully add the
upward pressure producing a contribution rate of 23%."
B. Medicare's Deceptive Problem
An aging United States population will raise Medicare costs
proportionately more than those of any other nation's national health
care/insurance system. In all other rich democracies, when a person turns
sixty-five the incremental cost to the national insurance fund, health
service, or mandated insurance scheme is only the difference between that
person's medical costs at ages sixty-four and sixty-five. Because Medicare
only covers the elderly and the disabled, when a person turns sixty-five the
entire cost to Medicare is new.
However, it is a new cost only to the federal budget. When a person is
added to the Medicare budget, costs to other payers, such as employers,
fall; even the federal government may have an offsetting gain if it was
previously granting a tax subsidy to an employer for providing private
insurance. 6 If we were to consider society as a whole, or if the United
States-like other wealthy democracies-guaranteed health care or
insurance to anyone other than the elderly, the demographic effect would
look smaller.
The aging population might be expected to raise Medicare spending
71 (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 25, 2003). That increase in the aged population
share, multiplied by the Gruber and Wise coefficient, yields slightly less than a 0.9% of GDP
increase in health spending. Note, however, that Gruber and Wise's estimate had a standard
error of 0.069, so should be treated with caution. Gruber & Wise, supra note 12.
14. JURGEN VON HAGEN & RoLF R. STRAUCH, GERMAN PUBLIC FINANCES: RECENT
EXPERIENCES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 4 (Ctr. for Eur. Integration Stud. Working Paper No.
B13, 2001).
15. Id.
16. The example of a person who is employed to age sixty-five, has health insurance
through employment, and then retires and goes on Medicare is, of course, a simplification.
Many people retire earlier, have some mix of coverage then from their former employer or
other sources (e.g., a spouse's employer), or never had insurance. However, in virtually all
cases people who go on Medicare are giving up some other coverage, and the sponsor of
the other coverage therefore is saving money.
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by slightly more than two percent of GDP between 2000 and 2070.17 But
the Medicare Trustees projected that spending would rise by a total of
6.2% of GDP over the same seventy years.18 In short, spending increases
due to non-demographic factors are expected -to be nearly double the level
of increases resulting from demographic changes. These assumptions do
indeed make Medicare seem unaffordable. Moreover, when applied to the
health care system as a whole, these same assumptions yield presumably
untenable results. If they are correct, American health care spending will
rise to thirty-eight percent of GDP by 2075. '9 Clearly that would be a far
more severe circumstance than the roughly two percent of GDP increase in
Medicare costs attributed to demographic trends.
Thus, there is plenty of reason to worry about health care cost
control.2° Unfortunately, there is no credible evidence that changes in
Medicare's entitlement, sometimes promoted as solutions to the cost
problem, would do any good at all. The usual reform suggestion is that
Medicare be turned from a defined benefit program, in which the federal
government provides insurance for a standard set of benefits, into a
"premium support" system, in which the federal government provides a
contribution and individuals purchase insurance from a set of public and
private options. However, the available data do not lend support to the
idea that competition and privatization would save money.' For example,
17. I do not have access to estimates of this precise effect. But, for example, the
Congressional Budget Office estimated in 1998 that demographic factors alone would raise
Medicare spending from 2.6% of GDP in 1995 to 4.4% in 2030, 4.5% in 2050 and 4.8% in
2070. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LONG-TERM BUDGETARY PRESSURES AND POLICY OPTIONS 49, 58
tbls. 4.2 & 4.5 (1998). It is important to note that spending net of enrollees' premiums
would be a bit lower and the baseline for these 1998 estimates was significantly higher than
actual spending in 2000. That is why I adjusted the figures as I did.
18. BD. OF TRS. OF THE SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST AND SUPPLEMENTARY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS
29 (2003), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/2003/tabiia3.asp.
19. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN. , TECHNICAL REVIEW PANEL ON THE MEDICARE TRS. REPORTS,
REVIEW OF ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODS OF THE MEDICARE TRUSTEES' FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS 30
(2000), available at http://www.cms.gov/publications/technicalpanelreport/report.pdf.
20. I have argued elsewhere that policyrnakers could never adopt policies to promise
some controlled level of spending more than a few years in the future. See, e.g., WHITE, supra
note 3, at 110-13. Yet they should still control costs in the short run by any responsible
methods they can find, following the best available information.
21. See WHITE, supra note 3, at 252; Marsha Gold, Can Managed Care and Competition




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 4 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol4/iss1/2
(How) Is AGING A HEALTH POLICY PROBLEM?
even after two successive years (1997 and 1998) in which traditional
Medicare spending per enrollee slightly shrank, Medicare's costs per
enrollee grew by only about twenty-five percent from 1999 through 2003,
while private insurance premiums rose by about fifty-five percent.2  Given
Medicare's superior cost control performance, arguments that it must be
reformed to look more like private insurance due to the coming
demographic crisis are questionable at best. It would be more reasonable
to infer that the rest of the system should be reformed to more closely
resemble Medicare.
C. The Mythical Ethical Challenge of the "Old Old"
Within the general fear-mongering about health care costs for the
elderly, one issue is treated as raising particularly severe ethical and
financial issues: the growth in the population of "old old." The theory is
that very old and frail people incur particularly high medical costs and that
those costs are unproductive from a societal perspective since those people
23will die soon anyway. Such financial concerns may be joined with
bioethical concerns about the appropriateness of extending life for people
with few prospects of surviving or worries about the need to allocate care in
such a way that expensive care for the very old does not divert resources
from care for younger persons.
Fortunately, as it turns out, neither end-of-life care nor aging within
the elderly population makes much of an independent contribution to
increases in total health care system costs. For example, within Medicare,
spending at the end-of-life has remained a nearly constant share of total
costs.24 Population aging turns out to have cost-saving as well as cost-
increasing implications.
Costs for an eighty-year-old person are, on average, much higher than
22. I arrived at this figure by using data from BD. OF TRS. Or THE SOC. SEC. & MEDICARE
TRUST FUNDS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TRUST
AND SUPPLEMENTARY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 29 tbl.IV.Bl (2003), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/2003/tabivbl .asp. See also Bradley C.
Strunk et al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth Accelerates Again in 2001, HEALTH AFF., Sept.
25, 2002 Web Supplement, at 299, 306; Bradley C. Strunk et al., Tracking Health Care Costs.
Trends Stabilize but Remain High in 2002, HEALTH AFF.,Jan.-June Web Supplement, at 266,
272, available at
http://www.openminds.com/indres/Health% 20Affairs%20June% 202003.pdf.
23. See PETER G. PETERSON, WILL AMERICA GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD? 26-27 (1996).
24. James Lubitz et al., Longevity and Medicare Expenditures, 332 NEW ENG.J. MED. 999
(1995).
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for a sixty-five-year-old person.215 The major reason is that an eighty-year-old
is more likely to die, and mortal illness tends to be expensive. As life
expectancies increase, there will be more eighty-year-old people, but each
of them will also be less likely to die. Thus, the average cost of eighty-year-
olds should go down as the number of eighty-year-olds goes up. Analyses
have shown the two effects largely canceling each other out, not only in the
United States's Medicare program, but in Switzerland26 and across the
OECD nations. 7
Could the future have a different dynamic than the past? I have noted
that longevity increases have been associated with lower spending at a
given age because fewer people are dying at that age and dying is
expensive. However, it is possible that future increases in life expectancy
will be attributable to highly expensive medical interventions. In other
words, there could be just as many eighty-year-olds having what would now
turn out to be fatal illnesses in 2030 as there are today; their treatment
could be as or more expensive in constant dollars; and more of the
treatments could work. Then increased longevity would cause extra costs
with no offsetting savings. That is possible, but entirely speculative. With
equal logic, one could project that certain medical innovations (e.g., in
cardiac care) will be relatively efficient; people will be "saved" more
cheaply, and then die quietly of old age, also cheaply. Medicare data show
that "the costs of medical treatment near death decrease with increasing
age of death."28 For the moment, it is reasonable to hypothesize that
longevity increases in the future will have roughly the same profile as in
the past.
If we extrapolate from experience to date, the organization and
finance of health care will have far more effect on both the cost and quality
of future medical care than will the effects of demographic change. From
this perspective, population aging is, as Peter Zweifel and colleagues have




25. HousE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 104TH CONG., 1996 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND
MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THEJURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MEANS 246-47 tbls.3-50 (Comm. Print 1996).
26. Peter Zweifal et al., Aging of Population and Health Care Expenditure: A Red Herring?, 8
HEALTH ECON. 485 (1999).
27. See HOWARD OXLEY & MAITLAND MACFARLAN, HEALTH CARE REFORM: CONTROLLING
SPENDING AND INCREASING EFFICIENCY (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 149, 1994); see
also AGING IN OECD COUNTRIES, supra note 7.
28. Lubitz et al., supra note 24, at 1001.
29. Zweifal et al., supra note 26.
IV:l1 (2004)
8
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 4 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol4/iss1/2
(How) Is AGING A HEALTH POLICY PROBLEM?
I1. DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN THE ELDERLY AND OTHER CITIZENS
We have seen that demographic trends have a relatively small effect on
health care costs, and in particular, the fear of increasing costs for the "old
old" is not justified. Yet an important normative question remains: If there
are more elderly compared to the number of workers, does that mean that
publicly guaranteed benefits for the elderly should be reduced? In the
standard formulation, "our children" will pay more for our health care
when we retire than we did for "our parents"' health care, because we are
expected to live longer than our parents. Is that fair?
A. Why Increasing Longevity Does Not Make Pay-as-You-Go Systems Unfair
As the point is commonly argued in the case of pensions, the burden
on "our children" or "our grandchildren" should be reduced by shifting
from a system in which each generation pays for its predecessors through
taxes to one in which the currently aging group pays for itself through
some system of savings. In pension terms, it would be a shift from "pay-as-
you-go" to "pre-funding." Such an approach has been recommended for
health care by one of the two current public trustees of the Medicare
program, Thomas Saving.
30
However, there is apparent inequity in changing from a pay-as-you-go
system to a pre-funded arrangement: Some generation must pay twice,
financing its elders in addition to pre-funding itself. Moreover, that
inequity is unnecessary, since increasing life expectancies do not
themselves alter the relative merits of pay-as-you-go funding.
In a pay-as-you-go system, the average person born in 2000 will pay
more for retirement pension and health expenses than will the average
person born in 1980 because the number of individuals who are retired
during the life of a person who is born later will, other things equal, be
increased due to the fact that more people will live to retirement and, once
retired, they will live longer. That's what increased life expectancy means.
Yet the same logic applies to the individuals themselves: Increased life
expectancy for a person born in 2000, compared to a person born in 1980,
means the former would have to save more for herself alone because the
ratio between her own years in retirement and years in work would be
larger. Thus, either way, increasing longevity has the same effect. People
born later have to set aside a larger share of their income while working,
30. Phil Gramm et al., Medicare Policy for Future Generations: Search for a Permanent Solution,
338 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1307 (1998).
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either through taxes to support those who have previously retired or
savings to support themselves. The only legitimate question is how people
can best guarantee themselves some security in old age, and greater
longevity does not alter the relative security of tax-based redistribution as
compared to individual savings.
In practice, people contribute to social insurance systems, such as
Social Security and Medicare, as part of a compulsory social contract, in
which paying taxes to support others creates one's claim to benefits for
one's self later. This contract has risks, but so do market investments. Each
is a way to make claims upon the future; if there is an ethical difference it
is in how they distribute risks.
The basic argument for social insurance approaches is that they spread
risk in a more socially acceptable way than if the elderly relied entirely on
family and market claims to benefits. Social insurance redistributes from
high-earners to low-earners, from the relatively well to the sick, and from
those with shorter lives to those who live longer. Compared to relying on
personal investments, access to adequate living standards (including
healthcare) while retired in a social insurance system depends much less
on one's income while working, degree of luck with investments, and
longevity after retirement. Reliance on intra-family transfers carries the
same risks as personal investments, especially since individuals with low
incomes tend to have children with low incomes, and so a parent's
misfortune would be doubly visited upon his or her children.
B. Pressure on Other Programs or Incomes
One might argue, however, that even a small increase in costs due to
aging is "unaffordable" because the money could be better spent on other
programs or better left in private pockets. In this view, health care costs for
the elderly would be taken from education or aid to impoverished
children, other public "investments in the future," national security, or
private investments to develop the economy.
This argument has two components-one economic and one
distributional. The common doomsday scenario claims that higher health
31. The argument here does not apply to situations of unequal cohort size. There is
more of an argument for having the baby boomers in some sense "pre-fund" their costs in
retirement than for pre-funding simply due to increasing longevity. The boomers, however,
can pre-fund their costs in more temporary and flexible ways, such as by creating budgetary
conditions that decrease government debt obligations. Reducing debt service costs from
2020-2035, for instance, would free up revenues that could be used to cover some of the
extra pension and health costs due to the size of the baby boom cohort.
IV:l1 (2004)
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care costs will devastate the economy. This argument assumes that
government will incur these costs, but not raise taxes or reduce other
spending to pay for them. Following that scenario, government deficits
would rise steadily as borrowing yields higher interest costs and thus more
borrowing. Eventually deficits would be so high that they would consume
all possible sources of investment and so could be financed only by
32running down the nation's capital stock, destroying the economy.
Although this vision has been widely promoted, there is no reason to
assume governments will let the budget situation become so dire.
Governments respond to rising deficits by taking steps to control them,
even if they do not do so as quickly or thoroughly as "deficit hawks" wish.
Scenarios that presume governments will let deficits spiral irredeemably
out of control are extremely speculative. Moreover, raising taxes to pay for
this government spending may have little effect on the economy.33
The more serious issue is how the choices governments are likely to
make to control deficits will affect citizens. From this perspective, what
might be called the "affordability" of health care for the elderly is really a
matter of preferences. The money could arguably be taken from other
government programs that do not work as well, or, by taxes, from private
consumption that one could consider to be of less social value. Whether
health care for the elderly is less important than military spending, or than
wealthier individuals buying more expensive automobiles, or than citizens'
ability to consume liquor and tobacco, or than governments propping up
declining industries, or than any other alternative consumption, are
political and moral judgments that will be made differently by different
people.
Only two things should be clear about such choices. First, health care
spending for the elderly is not obviously less important than a whole range
of alternative expenditures. Second, judgments about distributional
tradeoffs concerning future consumption are best made by future
consumers, according to their preferences, rather than by us. We certainly
32. This doomsday scenario is at the heart of a series of forecasts done by the U.S.
General Accounting Office beginning in 1992 and the U.S. Congressional Budget Office
since 1997. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM FISCAL
OUTLOOK (1997).
33. The evidence that raising taxes somewhat to pay for government spending as a
share of GDP must have significant negative economic effects is quite weak. Available data
are less than great, but for one simulation of effects, see KETIL HVIDING & MARCEL MERETTE,
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PENSION REFORMS IN THE CONTEXT OF AGING POPULATIONS
(OECD Study on the Pol'y Implications of Aging Working Paper No. 3, 1998). For a more
extensive discussion and citation to U.S. analyses, see WHITE. supra note 3, at 73-98.
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have no reason to assume that voters in, for example, 2020 will prefer to
cut health care for the elderly-especially since voters in no rich
democracy to date have made a similar choice.
Under what circumstances would reductions in health care targeted to
the elderly be justified? It is surely reasonable to believe that health care, in
principle, should be one of the highest priorities for social sharing. Pain,
disability, and death are things most people would pay to avoid before they
would purchase whatever else might be bought with, for example, the last
twenty percent of an average retiree's income. Inequalities in access to
relief of pain, or in access to life-saving treatment, may seem less
acceptable than other inequalities.
Some commentators believe that social sharing to provide health care
to eighty-year-olds is inherently less desirable than providing care to
younger citizens. In Richard Lamm's words, "[w] e have created a Faustian
bargain, according to which our aging bodies can and will divert resources
that our children and grandchildren need for their own families and that
public policy needs for other important social goods."34 Yet Lamm's belief
that a decent society would guarantee less health care to an eighty-year-old
than to a forty-year-old does not appear, judging from existing social
policies around the world, to be a common belief. In all rich democracies,
access to medical care is more equalized than access to other goods, and
there is no explicit discrimination against the old. 5 In the United States,
the elderly are actually favored, being the only group guarariteed health
insurance-perhaps because they are the group with the most obvious
need. One reason for these policies may be that the distinction between
the elderly and other people is ephemeral: Most individuals hope to be
elderly some day. Another is human sympathy: Most people are likely to
have elderly loved ones whose lives they value. And some objections may be
moral: Defining some lives as more valuable than others simply due to age
is incompatible with many ethical and religious traditions.
Policymakers can make future trade-offs easier by adopting more
cautious policies in the present. They should be careful to control health
care costs as much as possible. They should also avoid unnecessary military
spending, cut taxes only if they can be sure not to create deficits that will
cause higher interest costs, and avoid starting new programs of any sort
34. Lamm, supra note 5, at 203.
35. See, e.g., NETHERLANDS: COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRE INCLUDING BILATERAL FOLLOW-UP
FOR THE 2000 REPORT ON PROGRESS (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper No. 1 B, 1999)
[hereinafter NETHERLANDS]; UNITED STATES REPLY TO OECD SURVEY (OECD Econ. Dep't
Working Paper, 1999) [hereinafter U.S. REPLY].
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which do not provide good value for money. By reducing interest costs in
the future, such measures can make other programs more affordable. The
Clinton Administration took this approach, building up a budget surplus
through a mix of progressive tax increases, selectively reduced spending,
and good fortune.3" In this way, the United States was part of an
international trend; most rich democracies were pursuing policies to
reduce debt burdens and thus debt service. As the Economic Policy
Committee of the European Community put it, it was important to realize
"the contribution which budget discipline can make via a lower interest




In short, while future trade-offs are an important consideration, there
is little reason to assume that health care for the elderly per se should be
the loser. Policy-makers would do best if they presently adopted cautious
budget policies on all dimensions.
III. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION: THE ELDERLY AS WORKERS
In other countries, health care for the elderly and for workers are not
really separate subjects; in essence, all are grouped in the same insurance
pools. Health care arrangements then neither push nor pull people in or
out of the work force. Cash income is another story: In most wealthy
democracies, the sources of pensions for the elderly are very different from
wages for workers. Hence, the choice to work or retire depends in part on
governmental policies that set the terms for both contributing to and
receiving pensions. There are obvious financial benefits from policy
changes that, at the very least, stop discouraging individuals from working
longer. Moreover, policies that discourage working with confiscatory
effective tax rates seem unfair. By one calculation, the implicit tax on
Dutch workers who work past the age when they could take retirement is
141%. In the United States, there is no such penalty. 3 In the future,
reduced morbidity among the elderly should mean greater ability to work
36. The end of the Cold War allowed a reduction in U.S. military spending totaling
1.5% of GDP. Legislation in 1990 and 1993, combined with a dose of good luck, raised
revenues by 3.0% of GDP. In turn, debt service costs fell steadily. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCALYEARS 2002-2011 143,147, 149 (2001). These
policies would, if maintained, have paid for most of the projected increases in spending for
Social Security and Medicare over the next 30 years. See WHITE, supra note 3.
37. EUROPEAN CM'Y. ECON. POL'Y COMM., PROGRESS REPORT TO THE ECOFIN COUNCIL ON
THE IMPACT OFAGEING POPULATIONS ON PUBLIC PENSIONS SYSTEMS 41 (2000).
38. Gruber & Wise, supra note 12, at 47.
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at, for example, age sixty-seven. Changing job structures may mean that a
larger share ofjobs can be done by older persons, while the same emphasis
on mental rather than physical abilities may require that individuals begin
productive work at an older age. As a result of both more time spent in
training while young and the greater ability to be productive while old,
policies that encourage later retirement may be more equitable than
current policies. On the other hand, the argument for raising ages of
entitlement to pensions may be taken too far. Some work, such as driving
delivery trucks or working in kitchens, is physically demanding, and
therefore policies that alter pensions in order to encourage people to work
longer should recognize that this makes more sense for some types of
workers than for others. But this difference can be recognized in part by
basing entitlement to pensions on years in the work force as much as age:
Workers whose jobs involve physical labor are likely to have spent less time
being educated, and so to have entered the work force sooner than those
workers whose jobs allow them to maintain productivity later in life. On
the whole, the most reasonable response to the fact that population aging
under current law would produce a shrinking labor force is to adjust
pension laws and other policies so as to encourage greater labor force
participation. By raising revenues, this in turn would make health care
costs for the elderly more affordable.
To summarize, there is little ethical or financial reason to focus on
reducing health care spending on the elderly. Policies to increase
workforce participation, so long as they are not punitive, are a much better
idea. Both conclusions are supported by recent analyses from the OECD
and European Community (EC). For example, the OECD's "seven
principles to guide the reforms needed to address demographic pressures"
only call for "a greater focus on cost-effectiveness in health care," rather
than any direct reduction in the entitlement to care. 39 Those principles
include reducing incentives for early retirement, diversifying the mix of
pension sources, and improving labor market opportunities for older
workers.40 The first questions in the OECD's review of national policies to
address the challenges of an aging society focus on "[r]etirement
[i]ncentives and [1]abour [s]upply. ' '4 ' The European Community's work
39. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., POLIcY REPORT: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN
AGEING SOCIETY1, 2 (1998).
40. Id. at 2.
41. NETHERLANDS, supra note 35; U.S. REPLY, supra note 35; GERMANY: QUESTIONNAIRE
2000 ORIGINAL REPORT (OECD Econ. Dep't Working Paper, Jan. 27, 2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/55/2425505.pdf (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
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has also highlighted the importance of labor supply issues.42 Policies to
increase labor supply could include further encouragement of
childbearing and of women entering the work force (though these may
seem to be contradictory goals). A September 2003 review in the OECD
Observer recommended a "radical policy package" that "would include the
following steps: eliminate early retirement schemes; make old-age pension
schemes actuarially neutral so that pensions fully reflect time spent in
work; raise standard, retirement ages; increase childcare subsidies;
eliminate tax discrimination against female participation; and enhance the
role of part-time work."4 3 Apparently denying health care specifically to the
elderly was viewed as more than "radical," because it was not been
suggested.
No one should imagine that policies to increase the workforce are easy
to implement. Employers prefer not to hire older workers, other things
being equal." Additionally, factors such as the rate of female participation
in the labor force depend on more than pensions.45 Yet, it is instructive that
the trend among analysts and policymakers in other wealthy democracies is
to emphasize workforce and pension responses to the challenges of an
aging society and to view health care as a different question-one that
should be treated on its own merits for all citizens.
IV. MATCHING SERVICES TO NEED FOR AN AGING POPULATION
While the impact of an aging population on the cost of health care is
likely to be less significant than many have predicted, its implications for
the organization of our health care system will surely be enormous. The
elderly consume both more and different health care services than
younger persons, and our health care system will need to adjust both its
supply and its structure to. provide these services.
A. Appropriateness of Care for the Elderly
Generally speaking, aged bodies do not work quite the same way as
42. See EUROPEAN CMTY. ECON. POL'Y COMM., supra note 37.
43. Jean Phillipe Cotis, Population Ageing: Facing the Challenge, OECD OBSERVER, Sept. 26,
2003, available at
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fulistory.php/aid/39/Population-growth:-facing-the
_challenge.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
44. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., WORK FORCE AGEING: CONSEQUENCES AND
POLICY RESPONSES (OECD Working Paper No. AWP4.1, 1998).
45. See EUROPEAN CMTY. ECON. POL'YCOMM., supra note 37, at 41.
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those of young people. Not only are they particularly prone to such
diseases as osteoporosis and Alzheimer' s,4 but clinical indicators may have
different implications for the old as compared to the young. For example,
lower blood pressure appears to be a sign of good health in young people,
but bad health in very old people.47 In addition, low cholesterol is
associated with mortality in older persons, though that may not be
evidence against prescribing statins Metabolic processes in older people
can also differ from those in younger persons; thus the elderly are both
more prone to anorexia and more prone to hypotension after eating.
49
There are also cases in which they appear to metabolize drugs differently
than do the young. 50 For all these reasons, studies done on other
populations may not accurately predict the performance of treatments
among the elderly.
The elderly may also interact with medical professionals differently.
Age creates comprehension and communication problems; at the same
time, relationships with physicians and their offices can take on a social
role-the medical office as a place to go-which fits poorly with the cost
control needs of medical payers. Moreover, the elderly are more likely to
suffer from chronic illnesses and multiple conditions, which require more
complex coordination of care than is the norm for younger patients.
America's "medical care ad-hoc-racy" is not very good at such
coordination.
B. Supply of Caregivers for the Elderly
Thus, there is good reason to believe that care for some of the elderly
can require a different skill set, both for individuals and for institutions,
than is needed to care for most other patients. 52 The need for training and
46. John E. Morley, Editorial: Hot Topics in Geriatrics, 58 J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIEs A, MED.
Sci. 30, 30-31 (2003).
47. Tamara B. Harris, Commentary: Aging Well and Aging Poorly: Primary and Secondary Low
Blood Pressure, 58J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIES A, MED. SCI. 662, 662 (2003).
48. Morley, supra note 46, at 30.
49. John E. Morley, Editorial: Drugs, Aging, and the Future, 57J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIEs A,
MED. Sci. 2,6 (2002).
50. Eric C. Petrie et al., Increased Plasma Norepinephrine Response to Yohimbine in Elderly
Men, 58J. GERONTOLOGY, SERIES A, MED. SCi. M155, M155 (2003).
51. David M. Lawrence, My Mother and the Medical Care Ad-Hoc-Racy, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 2003, at 238.
52. See Christine Tassone Kovner et al., Who Cares for Older Adults?, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 2002, at 78.
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research in geriatric medicine is already high and will grow dramatically.
Yet the extent of such a focus varies significantly across countries and is
particularly low in the United States. Greg O'Neill and Patricia P. Barry
report that "only three of the nation's 145 medical schools have a full-time
department of geriatrics that requires a mandatory rotation in geriatrics
for students and residents, and less than 3% of all medical students take
even one course in geriatrics. In contrast, every medical school in Great
Britain and 19 of Japan's 88 medical schools have such a department.,
53
Only twenty-three percent of American nursing programs have a required• 54
course in geriatrics. Yet, while the need for training in geriatic care has
been obvious for years, there has been hardly any response within
American academic medicine. The government could try to encourage
changes in medical and nursing school curricula, but governments
generally have great difficulty shaping behavior within medical institutions
or medical supply more generally. In any event, there is a very long way to
go, and it is highly unlikely that training will catch up to need before many
decades have passed.5"
While the medical needs of the elderly pose significant workforce
challenges, these are exacerbated by the need for an expanded supply of
the broad set of quasi-medical and non-medical services grouped under
the title "long-term care." As Joshua Wiener explains, "[L] ong-term care
services are largely provided by unskilled paraprofessionals, who are
overwhelmingly women and disproportionately represented by racial
minorities and ethnic groups. Low wages and benefits, hard working
conditions, heavy workloads and a job that has been stigmatized by society
make worker recruitment and retention difficult."5 6 Helping people to
dress, eat, urinate, and defecate simply is not an attractive career. Dealing
with individuals in various stages of dementia is trying. Perhaps these jobs
could be made more attractive with large dollops of money, but difficulties
like lack of respect, dead-end jobs, the cultural gap, and the physical and
mental stress of the work are not easily addressed with money.57 People
who do this kind of work with compassion often have some inner calling or
53. Greg O'Neill & Patricia P. Barry, Training Physicians in Geriatric Care: Responding to
Critical Need, PUB. POL'Y&AGING REP., Winter 2003, at 17, 17.
54. Mathy Mezey & Christine Tassone Kovner, Nursing's Geriatric Workforce Caring for
Older Adults, PUB. POL'Y & AGING REP., Winter 2003, at 22.
55. See O'Neill and Barry, supra note 53.
56. Joshua M. Wiener, County Portrait: United States of America, in FOUR COUNTRY
CONFERENCE, AGING AND HEALTH POLICY 87 (2001).
57. See Susan C. Eaton, Frontline Caregivers in Nursing Facilities: Can Policy Help in
Recruitment and Retention Crisis?, PUB. POL'Y&AGING REP., Winter 2003, at 8.
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strength, which is hard to produce with any kind of policy. And, even that
inner light may burn out quickly for many careproviders: Scandals in
nursing homes surely reflect the greed of some for-profit proprietors, but
may also show the difficulty of finding workers and supporting them in a
culture of caring for the elderly.
As society ages, we should expect those challenges to worsen, for there
will be greater need, and fewer workers to meet the need. Increasing the
number of workers by encouraging people in their late sixties to work is
unlikely to be the answer to filling the physically demanding jobs of caring
for the elderly-lifting and clothing individuals in their eighties, for
example. If future workers on average will be better-educated, that may
make it easier for them to work longer at white-collar jobs, but is unlikely
to make them more willing to work in jobs providing personal services to
individuals who need help with daily living. Moreover, some of the same
trends that increase women's labor force participation (and so increase the
total workforce), such as the breakdown of barriers to more and more
types of jobs, may further reduce interest in joining the nursing and other
caring workforces.
In the end, then, where will the caregivers be found? Some nations are
coming to rely more on immigrant nurses, and this policy may be worth
considering and encouraging. However, this may not be so easy to arrange.
If giving care is not likely to be an attractive career, perhaps it can be made
preliminary to, or a condition for embarking, on a career. Systems of
national service, or of student aid conditional upon prior service, might
provide some of the necessary labor. 58 Yet that too poses challenges,
ranging from how to create those programs to how to ensure that the work
is done well.
C. Who Should Pay for Long-Term Care?
Long-term care is a mix of professional services, nonprofessional
caregiving, and the expenses of daily life. A nursing home provides shelter
and food that, conceptually, are not medical benefits at all. Nor are they
really "risks" in the same sense as medical expenses: Many people will not
get very sick in a given year, while everyone must live and eat somewhere.
The fact that many services are not professional helps explain why they
have historically been separate from medical benefits-excluded from the
insurance programs and left for the state, provincial, or local governments
58. I say conditional upon prior service because I do not trust any system's ability to
enforce requirements for service after individuals have already received their benefit.
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to provide. r)' Canada has no long-term care guarantee comparable to its
Medicare,m and indeed "no national standard" for such care."" Germany
and Japan have only instituted such programs very recently.62 The
Netherlands is exceptional in having had fairly universal-though not
satisfactory to all-arrangements for quite a while. 63 In spite of this history
and related budget concerns, the policy trend is modest movement toward
expansion of long-term care benefits. Japan and Germany's creation of
long-term care programs in the 1990s is especially remarkable in light of
Japan's economic stagnation and the high costs of German reunification.
It seems likely that one reason for these expansions is that long-term care
services, being associated with evident disability, cannot be accused of
creating disincentives to work. In Japan's case especially, long-term care
benefits might even make it easier for women to participate in the
workforce, as daughters or daughters-in-law are freed from having to stay
home with aged parents. So, unlike pensions, the international concern
about improving labor-market participation does not militate against
expansion of long-term care benefits.
One could still raise questions regarding who should be responsible
for long-term care. Should people save for themselves or through social
insurance, and should programs be pay-as-you-go or pre-funded? In
practice, as opposed to academic speculation, private-market solutions to
the need for long-term care do not seem to be a major policy trend.6 Pre-
funding of long-term care is less practical than the pre-funding of
pensions, and could be crowded out by saving for pensions. Pre-funding
requires that costs be predictable, but long-term care benefits are much
less predictable than pension needs because future patterns of disability
are uncertain."5 If policymakers seek to create publicly-managed funds of
59. Mark Merlis, Caring for the Frail Elderly: An International Review, HEALTH AFF., May-
June 2000, at 142.
60. Raisa Deber, Country Portrait: Canada, in FOUR COUNTRY CONFERENCE, supra note 56,
at 57.
61. Merlis, supra note 59, at 142.
62. John C. Campell & Naoki Ikegami, Long-Term Care Insurance Comes to Japan, HEALTH
AFF., May-June 2000, at 26; Alison E. Cuellar &Joshua Wiener, Can Social Insurance for Long-
Term Care Work?: The Experience of Germany, HEALTH AFF., May-June 2000, at 8.
63. Paul Schnabel, Country Portrait: The Netherlands, in FOUR COUNTRY CONFERENCE, supra
note 56, at 79.
64. The standard private-market approach would be voluntary long-term care
insurance. The difficulty is it would be almost impossible to get people to voluntarily buy
this insurance at the prices at which it would be offered.
65. STEPHANEJACOBZONE ET AL., LONG TERM CARE SERVICES TO OLDER PEOPLE, A
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private assets to help pay for future pension costs (as has been proposed in
the United States and other countries), there will be fears of the
government managing too large a pension fund.6 Given those fears of
letting governments manage too much money, they are not likely to be
allowed to set up further investment funds for long-term care.
Long-term care also poses, in a particularly acute form, an issue that is
common to all social insurance: Who is really being protected by the
programs? Pensions, for example, protect not only the elderly, but their
children, who might otherwise have to pay to support parents. Medicare's
popularity also must be related to the fact that, if workers' parents and
grandparents were not guaranteed medical insurance, the workers would
be more likely to get stuck with huge and unpredictable medical bills. Yet,
long-term care would protect children not only from a financial but also a
physical burden-the chance that middle-aged or even older women, in
particular, might have to assist aged parents with activities of daily living.
Germany offers a cash benefit, in lieu of a service benefit, in part on the
assumption that many children would choose to care for their parents, but
would want to replace some of the income that they otherwise would earn
in the market. Family caregivers are even given time off and pension• 67
credits. Long-term care choices therefore involve uniquely complex
relationships among the family, the market, and the state.
Demand for long-term care of various sorts will increase. Yet, as noted
above, long-term care's finance and delivery tend to be separated from
core health programs. In the Netherlands it is part of the "exceptional
medical expenses" system, wholly public and separate from the health
insurance funds. In the United States, most long-term care is not part of
the universal entitlement of Medicare, but instead public support is
confined to Medicaid, a means-tested entitlement, and some programs for
veterans. This would not appear problematic if the set of caregivers and
institutions were entirely separate from the mainline health system. Yet
they are not, and separate financing pools can cause managers to
concentrate on cost-shifting (hospitals to nursing homes and back; states to
federal government and back) more than care-giving.
On balance, the complexities of long-term care in particular do not
challenge the above conclusion-that health care costs for the elderly per
se should not be viewed as an economic burden that must be fixed. First,
PERSPECrIvE ON FUTURE NEEDS (OECD Working Paper No. AWP 4.2 Eng., 1998).
66. WHITE, supra note 3, at 161-67.
67. Cuellar & Wiener, supra note 62, at 17.
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coverage in many countries is partial at best. ' Second, some coverage
might even have helpful labor market effects. Third, any projections of
future costs involve great uncertainties due to unpredictable morbidity. As
with health care more generally, the trend in other countries is more
toward guaranteeing coverage than toward taking it away.
CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed the health policy implications of an aging
society. As stated at the outset, claims that a growing proportion of elderly
persons in the population require reductions in social guarantees of access
to health care are a common part of analytic and policy discourse. Yet, I
have argued, this discussion tends to overstate some challenges and
understate others.
For a number of reasons, I have contended that the challenge of
health care costs posed by population aging is exaggerated. First, the
contribution of population aging to total medical costs is small compared
to other trends. Second, in America, separate budgeting of Medicare costs
makes increases in spending on the elderly seem more significant than
they should from a broader societal perspective. Third, claims that higher
government spending on health care is inherently harmful to the economy
deserve great skepticism-there may be mild negative effects but, so long
as governments actually pay for the costs, there should be little long-term
harm. Fourth, the claim that a growing proportion of the "old old"
especially threatens higher costs is not supported by existing data. What
might be termed bioethical concerns caused by aging populations can also
be overstated. Arguments posing a conflict between "the young" and "the
old" are suspect because normal young people generally wish to become
old eventually, so benefits for the elderly are also benefits for themselves.
Notions that the old should receive less medical care so as to leave more
resources for the young do not fit well with ethical or religious traditions
that value human life per se. Moreover, the border between "young" and
"old" is not so easily defined: If by "old" we mean people over age sixty-five,
then many of those individuals can be very productive members of society.
If the concern is actually that people who are so old as to be mostly
dependent should give way to the young, then that concern must not only
overcome the basic ethical objection to valuing some lives more than
others, but the fact that the "old old" do not represent a major factor in
increasing health care costs.
68. Merlis, supra note 59, at 141-44.
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It is true that in any situation where the share of the population that is
working declines and the share that is retired increases, there is a resource-
distribution conundrum. Retirees always live on the production of current
workers; social arrangements differ only in how they claim that
production-through investment income, intra-family transfers, or
communal sharing (government or other) arrangements. Thus, an
increasing proportion of retirees means either that retirees get less (if their
share of workers' production is stable) or workers keep less (if workers'
contribution to retirees increases with the larger proportion of retirees).
This distributional concern applies not only to consumption of health care
but, more directly, to pension finance. As this Article has argued, however,
reduction of health care for the elderly seems one of the least desirable
responses to this challenge. Skepticism about reducing health care for the
elderly appears to have become the norm, as referenced above, in analyses
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and by the European
Community. Those analyses and this Article argue that the most
appropriate response is to increase the supply of workers, particularly by
having policies to encourage later retirement.
In short, an aging society poses an array of challenges, but health
finance is neither a major factor nor the proper lens through which to
perceive the most important financial and ethical dilemmas. In fact, the
health policy problem that appears to be most directly related to aging is
the anticipated health care and caregiving labor shortage. The general
concern about how economies will function with the low proportion of
workers that are currently projected is especially relevant to how the health
sector, which employs large numbers of low-skilled workers in relatively
undesirable jobs, will function when there is an even greater need for
those workers.
It is not clear that any government will be able to do much to address
these labor supply problems. However, a range of policies-from
encouraging immigration to providing training to subsidizing such work as
national service-may be relevant and appropriate. Policymakers would do
well to spend more time thinking about labor issues-and less about how
to define insurance benefits or pay for health care thirty years from now.
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